

## Abstract

### Knowledge, *Naya* and Thinking

Dr. Rajjan Kumar  
Department of Applied Philosophy  
M.J.P.Rohilkhand University  
Bareilly-243006,UP  
Email. : [rajjanphil@gmail.com](mailto:rajjanphil@gmail.com)  
Mob. : 9412978712

Knowledge is acquired from two sources: sensuous consciousness and transcendental consciousness. Thinking is related to sensuous consciousness but in transcendental consciousness there is vision and introspection but no thought. According to Jaina doctrine, the knowledge gained from sensuous consciousness is a partial knowledge of a substance, not the entire knowledge of the substance. A person possessing sensory consciousness knows the part of the substance. The partial knowledge becomes the subject of controversy. Five individuals gain knowledge about five different aspects of any one substance and each of them believes their own knowledge to be perfect and true and that of the others to be untrue. In Jaina philosophy an effort has been made to change this approach and understand truth through right vision; this is called '*nayavada*'.

*Naya* is a point of view, a vision, and a way of thinking. However according to Siddhasena Diwakar- there are as many *naya* as there are ways of speaking- *javeya vayanapaha, taveya chev hunti nayavaya* . This extensive approach makes the areas of contemplation very difficult. It becomes problematic for the listener or the learner to come to any tangible conclusion. In order to ease up this problem the Jaina acaryas have described two separates areas for the thought: a. *Dravyarthika naya* and b. *Paryarthika naya* . *Dravyarthika naya* (substantial point of view): that means describing a thing with respect to its ultimate substance i.e. its persistence or permanence. *Paryarthika naya* (modal point of view): that means describing a thing with respect to its modification i.e. its origination-cessation of impermanence.

The two views have been delineated for the convenience of contemplation and veritable ruling. In fact the thoughts cannot be made veritable by dividing them in persistent and origination-cessation or permanent and impermanent. For exposition of change the modal point of view was adopted. Both points of views are relative. One *naya* only analyzes a portion of the whole, so naturally the remaining portion too remains allied to it. This perception clarifies the theory of relativity.

This relativity is also expressed in the sentence- as many viewpoints exist in as many ways of thought. The basis of this argument is its mode. Modes are innumerable hence viewpoints too are innumerable. Only does the combination of innumerable parts enable us to realize the substance in totality. This is not a correct perception to believe that one mode constitutes a whole. *Naya* is absolutism, but it is in no way the false angle to perception. It bears no eagerness to perceive wholeness in a portion; it is not an exposition of absolute truth. Hence there is scope for healthy contemplation through *naya* or viewpoint.

# Knowledge, *Naya* and Thinking

Dr. Rajjan Kumar  
Department of Applied Philosophy  
M.J.P.Rohilkhand University  
Bareilly-243006,UP  
Email. : [rajjanphil@gmail.com](mailto:rajjanphil@gmail.com)  
Mob. : 9412978712

Knowledge associated with truth. Truth is one and complete. At the same time it is also reported that all knowledge as well as truth is relative because of they all have innumerable aspects of facets. By different causes and limitations one cannot explain innumerable facets of truth, however one can elucidate its partial aspect with some relation. This relative standpoint is called *Naya*.

The doctrine of *naya* is the process of knowing the element part by part. From substantial *naya*, the substance is a real object; the mode is an unreal object. From modal *naya*, it is the vice versa. The substantial *naya* is the standpoint to comprehend the substance; the mode does not fall in its domain, but it does not mean that it denies the mode. Therefore, though *aikantika*, such standpoint is a valid point of view (*naya*). If the substantial standpoint denies the mode, it would become invalid (*durmaya*). Similarly the modal point of view comprehends the mode, but it does not deny the substance. Therefore, though partial, it is a valid viewpoint (*naya*). If it denies the substance, it, being absolutely *aikantika*, would become invalid. The non-relative one-sided view has created many problems in the field of philosophical thought. In *Syadvadtratnakara*<sup>1</sup> it is mentioned that the partial knowledge of a thing having innumerable aspects is called *naya* and *Nyayavatara* said it is nothing but a standpoint from which one makes a statement about a thing<sup>2</sup>.

According to Jaina scholars *naya* has been taken as science of thought, which provides ample strength to understand the truth in right way. It provides a way that implies in connection with philosophy of having the method of accurate thinking. It provides a way of approach and observation through which truth can be revealed in right way. *Akalanka*<sup>3</sup> says *naya* shows the intention of a knower *Dharmabhusanayati*<sup>4</sup> extends this view of *Akalanka* by saying that *naya* is a specific formulation of idea that can be detected or imported by knower through *pramana* with a certain and one standpoint.

Truth of course is one but is vary or found relative in context of our standpoint. One cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexities of things. Each and every statement of a thing is necessarily one sided and incomplete. An ordinary human being cannot discard or escapes away of the limitations of his senses that he has correspondingly his knowledge about a thing or Reality or truth is limited and partial and hence is valid only at a certain viewpoint, and this is nothing but *naya*. That is why *naya* has been considered a unique means or treatment to analyze the truth<sup>5</sup>. *Acarya Devasena*<sup>6</sup> elucidates the fact in quite convincing manner as knowledge of an object has been gained at certain and single viewpoint by giving up its many significant characteristics, that broken piece of knowledge of the object is true at certain viewpoint but not as a whole and this partial knowledge or understanding of the object is nothing but *naya*. *Naya* is a kind of knowledge or understanding, which is relative and partial but accurate

According to Jainas knowledge is of two kinds- *Pramana* and *Naya*. Knowledge of a thing as it is, has been considered *Pramana* and knowledge of a thing in its relation is called

*Naya*<sup>7</sup>. *Pramana*, according to Jainas is *avisamvadi*, and *aviasmvadi* means devoid of doubts. *Naya* means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing.<sup>8</sup> Hence *Pramana* is complete and *sakala* whereas *naya* is partial or incomplete and is considered *ekadesiya*. As we know everything has innumerable aspects and each statement of a thing is necessarily confined to one side of a thing and hence is one sided, incomplete and relative. This relativity of different aspects of a thing is the bases of *naya*, because *naya* provides partial knowledge of innumerable aspects of a thing. Dr. Radhakrishnan defines *naya* as a standpoint from which one makes a statement about a thing.<sup>9</sup> All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called '*naya*'<sup>10</sup>. Judgment based on this partial knowledge is also included in '*naya*'. Hence, *naya* is conceived from one particular point of view or one-sided knowledge.

*Pramana* and *naya* are two ways of expressing of truth or facts. One is complete and the second one is incomplete. Hence complete and incompleteness is a relative term in context of expressing of truths or facts. Now, a question is raised whether *naya* is *pramana* or *apramana*? In this regard it is said that *naya* is neither *pramana* nor *apramana*, but it is *ekadesiya* (one portion) *pramana*. This can be understood by such kind of example as presented by the Jaina logician<sup>11</sup>---A pitcher is filled with ocean water, the water of that pitcher is neither called a sea water nor it is granted as not-sea water. Since water of pitcher is filled with one portion of sea, hence it cannot be explained as 'not-sea'. Likewise the same way *naya* explains one aspect of *pramana*, hence it cannot be considered not-*pramana*. Thus, it can be observed that the object is known by *naya* is neither considered a complete observance of that object and has not been taken it as not-*pramana* of the object rather it is safe to say that it is a knowledge of one aspect of the object.

As per the approach adopted to define a certain thing or object at a certain aspect or *naya* itself is called by Jainas is *sunaya* (right approach or *naya*) or *durnaya* (pseudo approach or *naya*). *Sunaya* refers to that kind of knowledge or *naya* that exhibits the object from accepting one main kind of property of the object while keeping aside not rejected all other properties of the same object, which the object has. On the other hand *durnaya* is that kind of approach or knowledge under which only one property of an object has been taken, as the basic property to explain of that object while rest other property of the same object has been outrightly rejected without relative consideration of all these properties. *Durnaya* is against the rule of thinking of Jainas. Because in view of Jainas. *Pramana* means knowledge of object with considering its innumerable properties or attributes, which the object has. *Naya* concentrates on specific property of an object by considering the relative comparison of other aspects or attributes of the same object. But in *durnaya* one discards the relative approach of thinking by adhering single attribute of an object for its differentiation by other objects<sup>12</sup>.

The *Pramana* reveals the entire truth or object, whereas only a particular aspect is determined by the *naya*. The entire object is comprehended through the principle on non-absolutism is analyzed in parts by means of the system of *nayas*. The water from the ocean contained in the pot can neither be called an ocean nor non-ocean, but it can be called only a part of the ocean. Similarly, a *naya* though arising from the *pramana* is neither *pramana* nor non-*pramana*. A viewpoint (*naya*) is limited in its activity to the presentation of its own subject-matter. It is called a *naya* so long as it does not refute the rival viewpoint. As soon as the refutation of a rival viewpoint is attempted; it falls in the category of pseudo-*naya* (*durnaya*) on account of its being absolutistic in character.

*Naya* is a point of view, a vision, and a way of thinking. However according to Siddhasena Diwakar- there are as many *naya* as there are ways of speaking- *javeya vayanapaha, taveya chev hunti nayavaya*<sup>13</sup>. This extensive approach makes the areas of contemplation very difficult. It becomes problematic for the listener or the learner to come to any tangible conclusion. In order to ease up this problem the Jaina acaryas have described two separate areas for the thought: a. *Dravyarthika naya* and b. *Paryarthika naya*<sup>14</sup>.

*Dravyarthika naya* (the substantial point of view): that means describing a thing with respect to its ultimate substance i.e. its persistence or permanence.

*Paryarthika naya* (the modal point of view): that means describing a thing with respect to its modification i.e. its origination-cessation of impermanence.

Things or substance has infinite modes and they may have infinite approaches too. Even then for practical purposes things or substances may be observed in two senses viz. either by meaning (*artha*) or by word (*sabda*). As we know that there are as many *naya* as there are ways of speaking or knowing; however in popular scheme of division of *nayas* it is seven in number. Out of these seven *nayas* the first four are called '*arthanaya*' because of they relate to the objects or meaning and the last three are called *sabdanaya* so that they comprise to words. The name of the seven types of *nayas* is 1. *naigama*, 2. *samgraha*, 3. *vyavahara*, 4. *rjusutra*, 5. *sabda*, 6. *samabhirudha* and 7. *evambhuta*.<sup>15</sup>

1. ***Naigamanaya*** (Pantoscopic Viewpoint): The viewpoint, which originates by following the concept imported from *lokarudhi* (proverb) and *lokasamskara* (worldly impression) is called *Naigamanaya*. Impressions and proverbs are vary in contexts of space, time and indigenious people and accordingly various forms of *naigamanaya* be originated. Since an object has two types of attributes, viz. *samanya* (general) and *visesa* (particular) *naigamaya* considers both the properties of an object by taking sometimes-general properties as main theme or sometimes-specific properties as per bases of *lokarudhi*. In view of Jaina concept of *Nayavada*, *Naigamanaya* or non-distinguished regards object as possessing both the general and the specific properties, because no one can live without the other; all objects possess two kinds of properties *samanya* and *visesa*.

2. ***Samgrahanaya*** (Synthetic viewpoint): Existence is a generic attribute of a substance. From the attribute of existence the non-dualistic nature of a substance follows. A substance possesses attributes and, therefore, it is called the substratum (*dharmi*) of those attributes. The attributes are twofold- qualities and modes. The qualities coexist with the substance while the modes occur in succession. The substance is one unitary principle, while the attributes are many, and from this viewpoint they cannot be absolutely identical, as one and many have evidently contrary natures. Identity and difference are thus synthesized in a substance. This is the non-dualistic approach to element is the viewpoint called synthetic or *samgrahanaya*. There is a thought of ultimacy of the universal existence; and the so-called thought of ultimacy of the universal existence and the unelement of the particulars is a pseudo-synthetic viewpoint. Of course the universe can be a unity viewed as existence, but there are attributes other than existence in a substance. Particularity is one such attribute of the substance. Viewed from this attribute of particularity the universe would appear a dualism of existence (universal and particular). The real (*satta*) has two facets, viz. substance and modes or the universal (*samanya*) and the particular (*visesa*).

3. ***Vyavaharanaya*** (Pragmatic approach): it is that kind of approach which accepts the universal properties of an object and make difference among them as per need of practical necessity or applicability or utility. For example, when we use the word '*vastra* (clothes)' it cannot be

understood or applied or used for the different kinds and textures of clothes. Those who want cotton clothes without categorization they cannot find cotton textures. Likewise, one who wants to know the categories of *Jiva*, he must know the classes of worldly and liberated soul etc. These kinds of approach are relevant and useful for day today life and other earthly purposes.

4. ***Rjusutranaya* (momentary viewpoint)**: Identity and difference may be experienced with reference to either many things or a single entity. The experience of identity owes its origin to the substantial continuity whereas the experience of difference to the temporal modes. The experience focused on the immediate present as distinct from the past and the future is the momentary standpoint, which has manifold ramifications. In other words it can be said that the *Rjusutranaya* intends to define the present activities of a substance that a substance has but not the actual substance itself. It may be learned that the particularistic approach sometimes forgets the past or the future aspects of a thing and confines only to the present, and straight away to refer itself the natural thing. To explain some extent it is said though the past is defunct and the future is unborn. The reality is momentary being, a great flux even then it has manifold ramifications, some of which are as follows- Process and Product, Unconditional Annihilation, unconditional origination

5. ***sabdnaya* (Verbal viewpoint)** : The word is a powerful medium of our daily life, social and intellectual, which was invested with the power of expressing its meaning (idea or thing) by man himself. The word has also an intrinsic power of expression of its own. It travels from the mouth of the speaker to the ears of the listeners to reveal its meaning. Such revelation or expression is possible also by physical gestures. But the clarity of words is not possible in those gestures or other kinds of symbols. This is why that language is requisitioned for conveying meanings. Our ideas arise from language, and language in its turn makes those ideas capable of deep thinking in philosophy, logic and science. This is indeed the reason why the verbal viewpoint which is mainly concerned with the philosophy of word, meaning and propositions, occupies an important position in the doctrine of *nayas*. In grammar the difference of tense, case-ending etc. do not entail the difference of the referent, but this is not accepted to be so by the verbal standpoint, which claims that the difference in the tense and case-endings of a word necessarily implies difference in the nature of the referent.

6. ***Samabhirudhanaya* (Etymological Viewpoint)**: The viewpoint of etymology is much subtler than the verbal viewpoint. The synonymous words, according to this viewpoint, have different meanings, and they do not stand for an identical referent. For linguistic exactness we use specific words to connote specific modes. The practice of bracketing synonyms followed in the vocabularies is a defective method according to this viewpoint. Each word has a shade of its own which makes it irreplaceable by any other word, however close its connotation may be. A morphological difference in a word presupposes a corresponding difference in the meaning intended by the speaker. No two words can be used to denote the selfsame referent. Such use would involve confusion and contradiction. The power of expression should vary from word to word because the absence of variation would obliterate the morphological distinction of the words. Consequently, the two words should be admitted as one single verbal symbol. It is, therefore, asserted by this etymological viewpoint that the use of different words should be governed by the difference in the meaning sought to be expressed by them.

7. ***Evambhutanaya* (Functional Viewpoint)** : In this viewpoint the relationship between the denotative and the denotatum is further delimited. It takes the etymological meaning of words in action. According to it, a name should be applied to an object only when its meaning is fulfilled.

In support of its nature it is argued that if a thing is really recognized, even when it does not fulfill its function, then why can cloth be not called a yarn? In that the etymological meaning of the former must be satisfied by the latter. A word in order to be an exact denotative of the sense must refer to the present mode instead of a bygone aspect or an aspect that is to come.

In the interest of precision of expression one should use only the word that is indicative of immediately existing mode of the denotatum. In the proposition 'a teacher is teaching the student', the expression 'teacher' has been properly used because he is engaged in the act of teaching at the moment. But in the proposition 'a teacher is taking his lunch', the use of the word 'teacher' is not logically proper because he is taking food instead of doing any kind of teaching at the moment.

The substance stands for the universal whereas the modes refer to the particular aspects of a thing. Substance and modes are indeed the basic objects of cognition. Two fundamental viewpoints have been conceived on the basis of these two aspects of a real:

The cognition or the experience of the substance or the universal of a thing is the source of what is known as the substantial viewpoint (*Dravyarthikanaya*).

The mode or the particular in a thing is responsible for what is called the modal viewpoint (*Paryarthikanaya*).

Of the seven *nayas* the Pantoscopic, the Synthetic and the Analytic viewpoints fall under the category of substantial viewpoint. The remaining four viz. the Momentary, Verbal, Etymological and Functional viewpoints constitute the category of modal viewpoint. According to another system of classification the first four viewpoints are mainly concerned with the ontological aspect of a thing are called the ontological viewpoint (*arthanaya*). The remaining three, being mainly concerned with the linguistic aspect, are called the verbal viewpoint (*sabdanaya*).

The Pantoscopic viewpoint is called an idealistic standpoint (*jnananaya*) on account of its being concerned with the speaker's will or intention and also because the past and future modes referred to this viewpoint are mere ideas and do not reside in an external object. A viewpoint has a double function, viz. Experience the object and its verbal expression. All the viewpoints may be considered idealistic (*jnananaya*) on account of their being of the nature of experience. They can also be considered as the linguistic (*sabdanaya*) on account of their being expressed in verbal propositions.

The nature of thing (substance) is sometimes determined with reference to its intrinsic nature or the material cause (*upadana karana*) while on the other occasions it is determined with reference to modes arising from extraneous sources. In the former case the viewpoints may be called transcendental (*niscayanaya*) and in the latter the empirical (*vyavaharanaya*).

The doctrine of non-absolutism falls under two divisions, viz., complete comprehension through *pramana* and partial assessment through *naya*. The entire object is revealed by the *pramana*, whereas only a particular aspect is determined by *naya*. The entire object comprehended through the principle of non-absolutism is analyzed in parts by means of the system of *nayas*. The water from the ocean contained in the pot can neither be called an ocean nor non-ocean, but can be called only a part of the ocean. Similarly, a *naya* though arising from the *pramana* is neither a *pramana* nor a non-*pramana*.

A viewpoint (*naya*) is limited in its activity to the presentation of its own subject-matter. It is called a *naya* so long as it does not refute the rival viewpoint. As soon as the refutation of a rival viewpoint is attempted; it falls in the category of pseudonaya (*durnaya*) on account of its being absolutistic in character. An absolutistic viewpoint that asserts its validity independently of

any other viewpoint gives rise to controversy whereas the relativistic viewpoint or a coordinated viewpoint gives rise to reconciliation or absence of controversy. Even as gems strung together merge their individuality into a necklace, exactly so the different viewpoints embodying different experiences merge into the philosophy of non-absolutism being held together on the string of relativism.

## References

1. Syadvadtratnakara, p.8
2. Nyayavatara, 29
3. Laghiyastraya, 55
4. pramanagrhitarthekadesagrahi pramaturabhiprayavisesa nayah, Nyayadipika
5. vide A.N.Upadhye Silver Jubilee Vol.I, p.134
6. nanasvabhavabhyah vyavrtya ekasmina svabhav vastu nayatitinayah, Nayacakra, p.1
7. Tattavarthasutra, 1/6
8. Nyayavatara, 29
9. History of Indian Philosophy, vol.1, P 298 Vide Jain Prespective in Philosophy and Religion, Ramaji Singh, P. 242
10. Tattavarthaslokavartika, 1/33/6
11. nayam vastu, na cavastu vastuvansah kathyate yatah/  
nasamudrah samudo va samudranso yathocyet/ Tattavarthaslokavartika, 1/6
12. Arthasynekarupasya dhih----durnayastahnirakrttih, vide Aptmimansa Tattadipika,  
Into,p.88
13. Sanmatitarka, 3/47
14. Nayodwividhah, Sarvarthasiddhih, 1/6
15. Aptamimansa, karika 87